557d387a2e
Formatting done via: git ls-files | grep -E '^test\/.*\.(h|cc|mm)' | xargs clang-format -i No-Iwyu: Includes didn't change and it isn't related to formatting Bug: webrtc:42225392 Change-Id: I3a75019dee1ad9bef713d80a5f79cbc56adab472 Reviewed-on: https://webrtc-review.googlesource.com/c/src/+/373903 Reviewed-by: Mirko Bonadei <mbonadei@webrtc.org> Commit-Queue: Danil Chapovalov <danilchap@webrtc.org> Reviewed-by: Harald Alvestrand <hta@webrtc.org> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/main@{#43690}
28 lines
1.0 KiB
C++
28 lines
1.0 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2016 The WebRTC project authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license
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* that can be found in the LICENSE file in the root of the source
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* tree. An additional intellectual property rights grant can be found
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* in the file PATENTS. All contributing project authors may
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* be found in the AUTHORS file in the root of the source tree.
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*/
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include "api/transport/stun.h"
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namespace webrtc {
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void FuzzOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
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// Normally we'd check the integrity first, but those checks are
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// fuzzed separately in stun_validator_fuzzer.cc. We still want to
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// fuzz this target since the integrity checks could be forged by a
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// malicious adversary who receives a call.
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std::unique_ptr<cricket::IceMessage> stun_msg(new cricket::IceMessage());
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rtc::ByteBufferReader buf(rtc::MakeArrayView(data, size));
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stun_msg->Read(&buf);
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stun_msg->ValidateMessageIntegrity("");
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}
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} // namespace webrtc
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